

INTERPOLATION

CONTINGENCY, CHANCE, OPPORTUNISM AND HISTORICAL CHANGE

I

If history is to be more than news, or narrative, then it has to explain. Even as narrative, the historian's selection and ordering of events and attitudes, of successful and unsuccessful actions, of speech and writings, can be meaningful only if he selects and orders according to some causal sequence. History as explanation is a process by which a great diversity of events, actions, and utterances are shown to be causally connected, and, moreover, that the causes themselves are arranged according to some hierarchy of importance. It is in this sense that Collingwood regarded history as a science.

There are, of course, impediments. Equally of course, there has been no shortage of historians to point them out. Unfortunately, one of the most serious obstacles in the way of the explanation of the paths of causation in history is virtually intrinsic to the nature of historical studies and, more particularly, of their publication. This is periodisation: the division of historical time into periods - 'modern', 'classical', 'medieval' to start with, then with subdivisions, extensions, parallel formations applicable to non-European civilisations and cultures. All are essential, naturally, and quite unavoidable, unfortunately, but all, in the long run, taking on their own substantiality and appearing to be dictated by their own nature. It is as if history had been adapted to the format of Mendeleev's periodic table, on the lines of Primo Levi's recital of his life in terms of stories about the relatives, friends and acquaintances he encountered at its various stages.

The trouble is that historical change is often only observable in terms of differences in the product of human action, individual and social. In the case of economic and social institutions, such observation consists of analysis of the situations prevailing in a society before and after a given interval in time. The starting point for any analysis of historical change is that 'things' must somehow have 'changed' - that, for example, what I have read as the 'corporatist collectivism' of the Middle Ages was replaced by what could be characterised as the 'incorporated possessive individualism' of the mercantilist period.

But the differences do have to be crude enough to be observable. It is this that makes for difficulties. It is over thirty years since Reinhard Bendix voiced his criticisms of the conventional 'before and after' approach established by earlier generations of historians, but even now we are by no means free of those problems. They arise, Bendix suggested, because the situation at the outset and the shape which relationships, institutions and everyday activities assume at the end of the process, being crude enough to thrust themselves on our attention, present so striking and comprehensive a contrast that both take on the appearance of 'natural systems.'

Consequently, the 'before' and 'after' situations are apt to be visualised and analysed as if each were "an interrelated, functioning whole with systemic prerequisites, properties, and consequences, which may be identified as a 'stage of development'. Typically, such analysis runs the danger of reification, which occurs whenever a society is identified as a unit that maintains itself in order to 'survive' as such [S]tudies of this kind use familiar concepts such as feudalism, democracy, totalitarianism, etc., despite the many criticisms levelled against these terms.

Such concepts express something we wish to express, namely, that in some overall and important, but rather general, sense, an old social structure has passed away and a new one has taken its place."¹

Unfortunately, (because, however cautiously we move, any attempt to describe and account for historical change in the broad sense has to begin from a 'before and after' contrast which demands interpretation and explanation) the problem remains. True, the fact that it was a complicated, confused and, above all, piecemeal process is more or less universally acknowledged. What is still perhaps too often overlooked is that the process of change was not simply one of a progress through a number of well-defined stages; it was often wayward, sometimes retrogressive, and certainly uneven as between countries and even regions of the same country. And again, if one is trying to grasp at Collingwood's 'historicity of things' (and not simply to add a few more soundings and outlines to the chart of ethnocentric history) then it is necessary to put aside abstract definitions which bespeak, or are bespoken by, the 'natural systems' approach and to try to approximate, however crudely, to the terms in which the historical participants themselves saw things and acted.

II

To take the instance nearest to hand, Part III of this book opened by remarking on the established convention by which the period of European history treated as modern is regarded as beginning at the end of the fifteenth century. But it took the people of western Europe until the middle of the seventeenth century to register and act on the change in perspective within which they saw and interpreted their history - and their future. True, the props began to be knocked away much earlier. The adoption of the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* in 1555 at the Peace of Augsburg may have signalled the triumph of monarchism, but it also made a travesty of belief in history as ordained by God.

Yet it was not until the 'Enlightenment' of the eighteenth century, some time after the beginning of modern science, that belief in history as progress came to replace belief in the ordering of man's destiny according to divine approbation or retribution. (God retained a slightly backstage presence as instigator)². Ample confirmation of that belief was found subsequently in the 'Great Transformation' of the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution, and the consequent organisational revolution - the instauration of

¹ R. Bendix, "The Comparative Analysis of Historical Change" in T. Burns and S.B. Saul (eds.) *Social Theory and Economic Change*, Tavistock, 1967, pp. 67-86.

² In Pope's words: "Nature and nature's laws lay hid in night; God said, 'Let Newton be!' and all was light".

meritocratic bureaucracy as the model for large-scale administrative systems - in which they both culminated.

Belief in history as progress had achieved virtually universal acceptance in most European societies by the second half of the nineteenth century. It survived for well into the twentieth century, largely because of the 'survival of the fittest' take-over bid of Darwinian theory mounted by Herbert Spencer and the 'eugenists', but the disasters and betrayed hopes of the twentieth century weakened it to the point of surrender to a pessimistic nihilism. 'Postmodernism' (a term which may owe much of its popularity to its proximity to an oxymoron) involves somewhat cynical arguments against the success claimed for science and industrialisation in improving the human condition, and the rejection of any concept of objective reality and truth³.

There is another rather less dire view, put forward in the first place by Isaiah Berlin, which now seems to be gaining ground. In this, it is argued that for every generation its historical situation is unique. That situation reveals itself in the circumstances facing individuals and societies and meets its response in the needs and desires of individuals who have to act in the light of what they see around them - which includes how they see their fellows behaving, and what they remember or know of past situations and past actions. What is at work in the world around us now (as in the past), is neither some grand divine or teleological purpose nor random chance, but contingencies - and opportunities, along with new fears - and hopes.

"Some problems can be solved, some ills cured, in both the individual and social life but any study of society shows that every solution creates a new situation which breeds its own new needs and problems, new demands. The children have obtained what their parents and grandparents longed for - greater freedom, greater material welfare, a juster society; but the old ills are forgotten, and the children face new problems, brought about by the very solutions of the old ones, and these, even if they can in turn be solved, generate new situations, and with them new requirements - and so on, for ever - and unpredictably."⁴

So, when it comes to understanding wholesale changes of *Weltanschauungen* in the 'late monarchist' period which finally delivered the modern world from the medieval, what is centrally involved is not release from the limits set by tradition, brute circumstance or primitive technology, nor from the prohibitions laid down by legal or religious authority and the sanctions enforced by superior military, political or economic powers. What is of central importance is the transformation of what I can best call the 'circumstantial postulate' - the personal knowledge, the beliefs and assumptions about other people, the material objects and social institutions they encounter that individual members of society treat as the 'given' for decision-making. The 'circumstantial postulate' stands for the array of personal knowledge and experience that underlies what Bourdieu, following Panofsky, called 'habitus', a mental habit he defined as "a structuring structure, which organises practices and the perception of [other people's] practice."⁵ The concept is somewhat

³See Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, (trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi) Manchester Univ. P., 1991.

⁴ Isaiah Berlin, "The Pursuit of the Ideal", in *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, Fontana P., 1991, p. 14.

⁵ P. Bourdieu, *La Distinction* (ref. xii, 1, 170 in the translation published by M.I.T.)

broader in scope than Bourdieu's 'habitus,' which has more to do with the conception of the strategy, or strategic principle, that an individual follows in his more consequential actions ('practice'). The circumstantial postulate of a person comprehends the view of the world around the individual which assures him that responses to actions (his own and others') will be predictable, or predictable to an extent which can be assessed or guessed. It is what underlies, and gives rise to, feelings of trust - or distrust.

The circumstantial postulate idea, though hardly precise, is also rather more specific than that of ethos, or 'habitus'; it also dodges around the possible contribution that consensus, always a suspect notion, is ordinarily supposed to make to the formation of ethos. For circumstantial postulates exist - are activated - in relation to action by individuals, either by way of response to what is done by others or as basis for the considerations called to mind in contemplating action or justifying it. Hence, circumstantial postulates are most clearly relevant, and evident, when changes in institutionalised practice are adopted, contemplated, or contested.

Eighteenth century changes in market practices which had previously looked to religion, custom or law for sanction are perhaps the most numerous, well-defined (and well-documented) occasions for a circumstantial postulate to be articulated, but the same kind of change of gear in mentalities can be discerned, or inferred, in the history of other institutional strands. A sidelong glimpse of the process at work in its more inarticulate, or implicit, mode is afforded by Ernst Gombrich in his inspired use of the game of 'cat's cradle' as an analogy for the process which seems to be at work in the history of European art.⁶ What he had in mind was the recurrent tendency for younger artists to try to make something recognisably their own out of the techniques and approach they took over from the masters who were their predecessors. The process necessarily involves amending the strategy those before him followed in their practice, and so acquiring a 'habitus' which is to some extent something peculiar to himself. But after a number of moves in the cat's cradle game have occurred, a new kind of reference system becomes evident, in that what he is doing evokes responses which others share with him - responses, moreover, that he can rely on evoking.

The institutions of political, social and economic life have their cat's cradle processes, too. There is even a manifest concurrence between the accelerated 'cat's cradle' process at work in the art world of Italy, the Low Countries, and southern Germany in the later Middle Ages and in the surge of entrepreneurial activity, both of what can be called the risk-taking and of the gambling kind, in the same areas and at the same time, which spread to other countries in the following centuries.

III

The chapters which follow contain accounts, each of which is inevitably skimpy and selective, of the alterations made in a number of institutional strands - political, administrative, scientific, industrial, cultural. The shift from the impersonal 'changes occurring' to the personal voice of 'making changes' marks a change of gear from the broad scope of 'divinely ordained' or 'natural' system (or 'ethos') down to 'reference

⁶ E.H.Gombrich, *Reflections on the History of Art*, Phaidon Press, 1987, pp.233-4.

system', or 'circumstantial postulate'. For what is under discussion is what people decided to do and did, either as individuals or in concert, not their responses to their conditioning by what happened to be their historical - or social - situation.

Any acceptable account of the causes and implications of change in the political and economic systems or the social order and manner of social organisation which obtained in Europe from medieval to modern has to be rather more comprehensive - to cover more of the facts of the case - than the kinds of explanation that have been classroom favourites in the past, like the moral code of protestantism, or the decline of 'feudalism', or the change in the view of the world taken by Europeans and the command of the means to change it, or that most amorphous of historical clichés, 'the rise of the bourgeoisie'. What one has to look for is a set of assumptions systematically related to each other, which are borne, unexpressed, in people's minds but reveal themselves in choices - when some new institutional form is more and more frequently preferred to familiar, traditional, practice.

The facts of the changes in the preference order of institutional forms are straightforward enough. They bespeak the erosion, or absorption, or suppression of forms of organisation founded on the partition between kingly power and clerical authority, or on collective or corporatist communality, and their supersession by sovereignty, power or authority for specific acts or activities delegated by the sovereign to public officials or organisations, and individualism.

In the earlier period, systems and structures were organised according to three principles: the power of kings and lords; the authority of the church; or social order, expressed as membership of an established community, or - and here it was often oath-bound - of a corporate group or an institution with common privileges, purposes, or duties. Categorically different as those principles are, they nevertheless coexisted. Some more or less uneasy accommodation was looked for which, although constantly readjusted, was nevertheless durable because all forms of organised collective action were looked on as part and parcel of an organic community "a corporate society - compact, graded, deeply-niched by place and privilege," as Sheldon Wolin⁷ puts it.

Sovereignty (as against secular power and clerical authority), public order (as against social order), and individualism (as against communality), grew together in combination, gaining in strength because they were regarded as complementary - even interdependent. Nor was this the work of some mysterious force propelling societies towards some historical destiny of which they were unconscious. Hobbes was not the only man to want to see eliminated all forms of collective action which were not instruments of sovereign power and authority. It was a programme which took almost a hundred years in Prussia, just over half a century in Russia, but was accomplished in France in a single burst of legislative activity early in the Revolution.

No one has seen, or described, this transformation more clearly than Maitland. There is in one of his essays⁸ a passage concerning "those forces which were transforming the

⁷ S. Wolin, "Hume and Conservatism," in D.W.Livingston and J.T.King, *Hume: A Re-Valuation*, Fordham Univ. Pr., 1976, p. 254.

⁸ F.W.Maitland, "Moral Personality and Legal Personality" (1903) in *Selected Essays*, (ed. H.D.Heseltine et al.) C.U.P., 1936, pp. 229-31.

medieval nation into the modern State." He prefers to call 'federalistic' what I have labelled 'communality' ('corporatist' or 'collectivist'), but no matter for that.

To begin with, Maitland sees federalism (sc. 'communality') as the ethos infusing the whole of medieval society, and not merely village communities and city republics. And it is this which is threatened and overcome by the new conception of sovereignty and the new form of capitalism which grew up alongside it. "No longer can we see the body politic as *communitas communitatum*, a system of groups, each of which in its turn is a system of groups. All that stands between the State and the individual has but a derivative and precarious existence." True, the change of political, legal and moral climate does not make itself apparent so clearly and decisively in England as it does in France - although even in England, he reminds his audience, "we are in the presence of a doctrine which in Charles II's day condemned all - yes, all - of the citizens of London to prison for 'presuming to act as a corporation,'" and it was the Englishman, Hobbes, who saw corporations as "troublesome entozoa." But in France, "we may see the pulverizing, macadamizing tendency in all its glory, working from century to century, reducing to impotence, and then to nullity, all that intervenes between Man and the State.

"In this, as in some other instances, the work of the monarchy issues in the work of the revolutionary assemblies. It issues in the famous declaration of 18th. August 1792: 'A State that is truly free ought not to suffer within its bosom any corporation, not even such as, being dedicated to public instruction, have merited well of the country.' That was one of the mottoes of modern absolutism: the absolute State faced the absolute individual."

Yet even the French Revolution, he adds in an aside, spared commercial associations. In doing so, it acknowledged capitalism as an integral element in the regime it was setting out to establish. And ever since then, "French law has afforded comfortable quarters for various kinds of groups, provided (but notice this) that the group's one and only object was the making of pecuniary gain."

The changeover from the tripartite structure of the Middle Ages to confrontation between the absolutist state and the 'absolute' individual was not altogether total - especially, as Maitland says, in the case of England, but also elsewhere. Even in the earliest medieval times, ownership and possession of property were always by individuals. The awkwardness of the existence of corporate bodies was circumvented by treating them at law as if they were individual persons endowed with perpetual life. The oath-bound relationships which made up the institutions of medieval rule and dominance and of medieval collectivism and corporatism were between individuals: between a feudal superior and his 'man', between master and servant, between contracting parties, between 'brethren', fellow citizens, or colleagues. There was no end to the rights and duties of men and women as individuals.

By the end of the transformation, we still find partnerships as a common institutional form, one which is very much in character with the collective corporatism of medieval times. In England, there are even now institutions like Lloyds, the Stock Exchange, clubs, and the Inns of Court, all of them voluntary societies -*societates* - coming into existence without benefit of royal charter, letters patent, enabling acts of parliament or general legislation pertaining to corporations and companies.

Merely to enumerate them, however, is to show how few and how marginal these instances of the interpenetration of things modern by things medieval really are. For what has intervened is not simply a process of institutional development, of growth, or of progress, but a revolutionary change. The emergence of sovereignty and the nation state on the one hand, and of capitalism and industrialism on the other had begun to transform Europe into a new world long before the geographical new world of North, and then South, America broke off its political, cultural and economic dependence.

As one moves on to later times, it becomes, admittedly, increasingly difficult to avoid a feeling of there being some independent and autonomous epigenetic process at work in the development of the typical forms of capitalist enterprise from the guilds merchant on to the staplers, the regulated companies and so to the joint-stock companies. A joint-stock company is a rather modern-looking form of corporation. It owned the property common to its members, and had an identity quite distinct from theirs, although it traded, and entered into contracts, as if it were an individual person. It distributed the profits of its ventures to its members in proportion to the capital they had invested. It bought and maintained buildings, plant, vehicles, and ships. It recruited and paid its own servants, clerks and agents, who were the employees of the company, not of individual directors or principal officers, as would have been the case even in many government departments. Like its corporate predecessors, it was in principle immortal, and in practice often outlived generations of its members, and, lastly, it could exert political pressure and negotiate - not merely plead - with government authorities in the promotion and defence of its interests.

Yet much of what seems progressive or evolutionary about the development of, first, the staple, then the regulated company, and then the joint-stock company reflects the increasing eagerness and capacity of rulers to further their own economic interests. Mercantilism was no seventeenth or even sixteenth century invention. Medieval rulers learned quickly enough how rewarding it could be to encourage the organisation of commerce along collective lines (indeed, in many cases, notably France, it was over-eager). They had the example before them of the Italian and German towns, which had prospered on the basis of the identity of political and economic interests which was reflected in the structure of rulership; and collective organisation and incorporation under charter eased the exercise of control and the collection of customs duties. But these were on exports rather than imports. Rulers saw their advantage in the ease and convenience of modes of taxation rather than in leaving merchants to improve and extend their operations.

Whatever the prime mover, though, the orthodox view, marxist as well as liberal or conservative, of the development of trade from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries is of the evolutionary path followed by economic organisations, with regulated companies and joint-stock companies marking stages in the advance towards the eventual triumph of the institutional forms characteristic of modern industrial capitalism.

There are alternative views.

The status orders and economic institutions of medieval Europe were founded on what was essentially a system of trust. Normally, this was signalled - rather than underwritten - by the binding oath customary on acceptance as a marriage partner, a king's servant, lord's retainer or as member of a guild, a partnership, or any other corporate body, or on the striking of a bargain or engagement in a contract.

All the elements of medieval corporatism evident in the constitution of cities in Italy and elsewhere, extended families, clientage, neighbourhood loyalties, guild membership, political participation, citizen armies, the multiplicity of public offices at a variety of levels of administration and law-enforcement: bespeak an extensive and manifold system of trust relationships. It was common people's experience of, and faith in, the potency of common action rather than an intellectual elite's evocation of republican, or democratic, or even Christian principles which served as the basis for medieval corporatism - although when such principles eventually came to be articulated, it was easy enough to read in them a useful rationale for the experience of communality.

Increasingly, in the modern world (i.e. after the fifteenth century) one sees the displacement of organisational links founded on a basic assumption of trust by organisation implicit with the assumption of distrust. And it makes just as good - perhaps rather more - sense to see the process of change not so much as an evolutionary progress towards higher, more complex, better adapted, organisational forms as one of retreat from a fiduciary system which was being eroded, ground down between the upper millstone of political sovereignty and the nether millstone of competitive individualism.

Distrust, it must be emphasised, is not simply a matter of the disappearance of trust. For the consideration of the dichotomy of trust and distrust as a pair of alternatives, rather than of opposites, one has to turn to Niklas Luhmann. Trust, Luhmann argues, enters into situations of uncertainty as a substitute for knowledge. The function of trust is to minimise the differences in the circumstantial postulates of different individuals and so reduce the complexity of the situations which confront them, and thereby make it possible for them to act: "Trust reduces social complexity, that is, simplifies life by the taking of a risk." If, however, there is little or no readiness to trust, or if the risks involved in dissolving uncertainty in trust seem so great as to rule it out, the problem of how to act is left unresolved and the individual rendered incapable of acting. This marks the threshold at which distrust can supervene. "Distrust, in fact, performs the same function as trust in that it removes uncertainty about the course of action to pursue." In the absence of trust, the individual has to turn to "functionally equivalent strategies for the reduction of complexity in order to be able to define a practically meaningful situation at all..... Strategies of combat, of the mobilizing of reserves, or of renunciation make possible a conduct of existence based on distrust in a way which makes it possible to act within the circumscribed area."⁹

Trust and distrust are not in themselves rationales for action, but strategies for reducing the complexities of a situation to something we can handle, and so go ahead and act. 'Handling,' in this connection, signifies specifically cognitive processes - selecting features we take to be more significant, recollecting and considering analogous situations, relating various courses of action to possible outcomes, and so on. Handling affairs with

⁹ N. Luhmann, "Trust", in *Trust and Power*, Wiley, 1979, p.71.

distrust as a basic assumption is not a matter of voicing suspicions or displaying blatant lack of confidence but of general watchfulness and specific safeguards. Guarantees are looked for, property pledged, sponsors required, to back credit or underwrite losses. Virtually the whole of civil law was designed to adjudicate controversies, rival claims, and disputes between persons. (Civil law was descended from the Roman *ius civile*, which applied only to Roman citizens, but spread from northern Italy to the Holy Roman Empire during the 'Reception' - roughly from the 15th to the end of the 17th century - and the codification movement of the 18th century and under Napoleon.)

In brief, the progress of the new political, economic, and social order is marked by the progressive implication of safeguard procedures. Political affairs, notably those concerned with government and administration in England, France and Prussia, but also in the international relationships between the more powerful countries and between them and their weaker neighbours become suffused by a new watchfulness. The English Parliament saw its main concern as acting as watchdog over the ministers appointed by the Crown and their activities. In France, provincial *parlements* and *conseils d'etat* repeatedly challenged the right of the King to demand new taxes or even to attempt to relax the stranglehold of traditional practices and institutionalised privileges on the economy. In Prussia, on the other hand, the King, becoming almost obsessed with the necessity, as he saw it, of ensuring the obedience of his ministers and officials, insisted that every governmental order and judgment was instigated by him and issued over his personal signature. Wars were fought over the 'pragmatic sanctions' agreed among the more powerful rulers which were meant to ensure the succession of heirs to the thrones of Spain and Austria.

As for economic affairs, the progress of the new capitalist order is marked by the progressive implication of insurance, bonds and sureties, bankruptcy laws and, above all, the observance of standard accounting procedures which facilitate the inspection of transactions internal to a business undertaking.

None of this is to be envisaged as a smooth, automatic, progression. The path from transactions founded on trust - however guardedly, however hesitantly, however reinforced by kinship and the quasi-kinship relationship of oath-bound fraternity - to those founded essentially on distrust - however much reliance was placed on the law, on the effectiveness of overseers and of inspectors of work done and accounts - was full of stumblings, road blocks, detours and blind alleys. It follows, in miniature, the same kind of erratic, blundering path as that traced by natural philosophy in its journey from Christian belief to rationalism - from a closed world engineered, sustained and powered by God to an infinite universe in which God was, as Laplace remarked, an unnecessary hypothesis and whose existence was co-terminous with man's observations and investigations of it.¹⁰

To repeat, neither corporatist ideas nor corporate bodies constituted along communal lines were completely obliterated. They were overlaid by constitutional and administrative developments under monarchism, but were still very much alive, until the international, religious, and economic crises of the seventeenth century. The idea of trust

¹⁰ See A. Koyre, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* Johns Hopkins Press, 1957, p. 276.

itself was revived and given a new lease of political life by Hobbes and, especially, Locke. Notably, however, in Locke's writings the word has acquired a legalistic turn, one which is brought out quite clearly in John Dunn's interpretation: "In legitimate political societies, ... , governmental power is in fact conceived by rulers and ruled as a trust." and "they are accorded the discretion and the power they need solely in order to serve their subjects; they claim it solely for this purpose; and they use it, to the best of their abilities, solely for this purpose."¹¹ The provision echoes quite faithfully the definition of trust in English law as, in essence, "the separation of legal and beneficial ownership, the property being legally vested in one or more trustees but in equity held for and belonging to others."¹² Significantly, though, both cases allow for the possibility of distrust supervening, and there is provision for remedial action by the beneficiaries: the civil law in the case of private individuals, and the constant watch on the executive maintained by members of parliament.

Communality, too, reappeared in England, but, significantly enough, among the lower orders who played little part in political or commercial affairs. By 1689, they had been forced out of the political nation in which they had played a significant part during the middle years of the century; they were certainly not part of the 'trust' established under the Lords and Commons. The local demonstrations and riots which marked the attempt by people to hold on to - or re-establish - the 'moral economy' of the past in their local markets were more than a combination of those with common interests against their would-be exploiters. They were also 'demonstrations' - serving to re-define the community as principal participant in decision-making which concerned them all. Communality in this latter-day sense also lost out eventually, but only because people lost grip of self-consciousness as a community and surrendered to self-interest either as individuals or as members of an occupational group locked in a perpetual bargaining encounter with their employers, in which no element of trust, either traditional or legalistic, entered in.

The corporate collectivism of medieval cities also survived - after a fashion. It did so either in fossilised relics of a 'gothic' past, or as bits and pieces of the rituals and ceremonies built into the fabric of new-style corporations, as disembodied, metamorphosed and half-forgotten elements of popular consciousness.

¹¹ J.Dunn, "Trust and Political Agency" in D. Gambetta (ed.), *Trust*, Blackwell, 1988, p. 83.

¹² D.M.Walker, "Trust" in *Oxford Companion to Law*, O.U.P., 1980, p. 1241.